

“Turbulence that results from competition among . . . rival centers of power might well propel the nation toward shipwreck. . . .”

## Pakistan's Perilous Voyage

FARZANA SHAIKH

The political disarray that has characterized Pakistan since civilian rule was restored this spring brings to mind a bitterly funny passage in *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*, a recently published novel by the Pakistani journalist Muhammad Hanif. In the book, the country's devout military dictator from the 1980s, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, known for his contempt for politicians, rises from a prayer mat, wraps his silk dressing gown around his bulging belly, and declares it “the only civilian part of my body and hence out of control.”

An out-of-control belly may merit a giggle, but the prospect of an out-of-control Pakistan (which also happens to be a nuclear power) rings alarm bells across Western capitals. And indeed, good reason for alarm may exist. A devastating bomb attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September was said to be in retaliation for Pakistan's participation in the US-led war on terror, a war that includes American military incursions against Al Qaeda and Taliban bases inside the country. The attack suggests a dangerous tipping point could be imminent.

Meanwhile, there is no end in sight to the Islamist militancy that engulfs the country's tribal and northwestern regions. A constitutional crisis concerning the reinstatement of judges sacked last November by then-President Pervez Musharraf grows ever more acute. And the economy is in tatters. Inflation is running above 25 percent, its highest level in 30 years, and the rupee is trading at a 10-year low against the dollar. Economic growth, which has averaged 6 percent annually since 2001, is expected to decline to 4.5 percent this year. Food and fuel shortages have reached

critical levels, triggering riots in some urban centers. Pakistan's precarious credit rating has both discouraged foreign investment and thwarted the government's efforts to shore up fast-dwindling central bank reserves.

For all these reasons, the nation seems a vessel adrift, in danger of capsizing. Granted, it is not a rudderless ship, nor one without a captain. It is rather a ship under the command of too many captains—all working at cross-purposes and rarely, if ever, accountable to the hapless passengers. In fact, the common image of Pakistan as a state torn between two principal centers of power (the country's military and its civilian rulers) or between two opposing ideologies (the religious and the secular) is no longer very apt.

Instead, what has become clear since general elections in February 2008 is that multiple centers of power, with rival claims to power, now threaten to reconfigure traditional alliances.

The main centers of power today number six, beginning with the recently elected president, Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Zardari controls the government through extraordinary constitutional powers vested in his office, including the right to dismiss ministers and dissolve the parliament. A second center of power is former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), whose base is Punjab—the country's most powerful province. A third is the so-called “neo-Taliban” or “Pakistani Taliban,” spread across the country's tribal regions; they owe broad allegiance to the tribal militant leader Baitullah Mehsud.

A fourth power center is the legal fraternity, which is pursuing a course of civil disobedience intended to force the restoration of senior judges who were summarily dismissed by former President Musharraf. A fifth is the United States, whose proxies (it is said) still haunt the corridors of power. And finally there is the Pakistani army,

---

FARZANA SHAIKH is an associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London. She is author of the forthcoming *Making Sense of Pakistan* (Columbia University Press, 2009).

along with its intelligence services, whose dark, sphinx-like approach to national security is the stuff of legend. The army may yet regain control of the country that it lost this year when General Musharraf's party lost the February elections and Musharraf himself had to resign the presidency in August to avoid impeachment charges.

Lagging far behind in power is an uneasy parliamentary coalition under the nominal control of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. His powers have been so comprehensively ceded to Zardari that some say Gilani does not even qualify as the "mayor of Islamabad." (Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai can claim to be the de facto "mayor of Kabul.")

The problem is this: The turbulence that results from competition among these rival centers of power might well propel the nation toward shipwreck, an event that would carry devastating consequences for both Pakistanis and the international community.

A glaring imbalance between elected and unelected power centers is no surprise to historians of Pakistan. They are well familiar with Pakistan's traditional consolidation of executive authority in the state instead of in popular institutions—as well as with the power of popular protest to force change in a system notoriously resistant to it. Many observers would also acknowledge, however, that this embedded dysfunctionality has resurfaced with unusual speed since the general elections. This perhaps suggests that fundamental political changes are at work today, trends whose long-term consequences could significantly alter the complexion of the state.

## THE MISSING MIDDLE

One such trend is the disappearance of the so-called "moderate middle," which in the past has been relied on to help bridge the divide between the policy preferences of the West, especially the United States, and those of the Pakistani electorate. The steady erosion of this moderate constituency has taken a heavy toll on governance and has all but ruined the chances of forming a coordinated policy to tackle militancy in Pakistan's tribal areas. It has also nearly ruined any chances of easing resentment against the United States, resentment that is only fueled by fears of a US-led invasion to smash Al Qaeda bases inside the country.

The erosion of moderation has been most noticeable in the strains within the coalition government that has been dominated by the PPP and its erstwhile partner, the PML-N. The two parties had agreed in March to enter into a coalition on the basis of an understanding that was said to involve the reinstatement of all judges sacked by Musharraf. But given the two parties' long history of rivalry, sharpened in the context of Pakistan's peculiar tradition of zero-sum-game politics, it is not surprising that before long they were locking horns. In May 2008, the coalition teetered after Sharif decided to withdraw his ministers from the government in protest of the PPP's failure to honor the agreement on reinstating the judges. Sharif, though he kept his party within the coalition, in June further distanced himself from his partners when he joined a week-long demonstration in which lawyers called for the immediate restoration of the sacked judges.

The two main coalition partners came together in early August to force Musharraf's resignation, but their entrenched differences resurfaced with

in days. Ominously, their divisions had now widened from disagreements over the reinstatement of the judges to recrimination over Zardari's decision to run for president in violation of a document,

called the Charter of Democracy, that both parties signed in 2006. This agreement had committed them to fully restore the 1973 constitution, which provided for a "nonpartisan" president stripped of powers to dissolve the parliament and dismiss the government. Zardari's nomination while still in command of his party and his apparent reluctance to curb the extraordinary powers that Musharraf had vested in the presidency, it was claimed, constituted a major breach of the Charter. The final rupture between the two parties and the collapse of the coalition came in late August.

These partisan differences, though couched in the language of politics and principles, masked rival personal agendas of the sort that have long defined party politics in Pakistan. Zardari and Sharif both regard their organizations as instruments for the promotion of private ends rather than as engines of public policy. In Zardari's case, the private ends amount to his personal campaign to resist a legal challenge mounted by the deposed judges to an amnesty that Zardari received for corruption

---

*The exercise of power in Pakistan remains closely tied to support from the army and the United States.*

---

charges. This grant of amnesty had made possible the return to the country in 2007 of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Zardari, her husband. (In exchange, they had pledged their party's support for Musharraf as a civilian president.)

For Sharif, who was ousted by Musharraf in a coup in 1999 and then banished to ignominious exile in Saudi Arabia, the private ends have involved cultivating judges prepared to invalidate a constitutional ban on his seeking the post of prime minister for a third time. Both Zardari and Sharif have avoided laborious consensus building—a process unfamiliar in Pakistan, where politics is typically shaped by conflict rather than compromise.

Also uncommon in Pakistani politics is the voluntary surrender of power—a practice that many unrealistically expected Musharraf to observe after his faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, the PML-Q, was soundly defeated in the February general elections. Although, during the run-up to the elections, Musharraf was briefly seduced by the idea of cultivating a political constituency through the PML-Q, he never lost sight of the fact that political power in Pakistan has historically flowed not from the electorate but from the army.

In a revealing speech in Karachi just weeks before his resignation in August, Musharraf sought to dispel rumors of his imminent political demise by declaring that his “last day” would be the day he lost the support of the army. He added that he did not think “the army [would] ditch me” or “leave me on my own.” Coming just days after US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher had in Islamabad publicly scolded Pakistan's politicians for their misplaced priorities in trying to displace Musharraf, the president's statement affirmed the long-established view that as long as regimes, especially military regimes, enjoy the support of the United States, their survival is assured.

Musharraf clearly understood the linkage: At a time of speculation about a breakdown in trust between the United States and the Pakistani army over whether Pakistani forces could wage an effective campaign against tribal militants allied to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Musharraf tried hard to bank on the claim that, as one who enjoyed the confidence of both Washington and

his country's army, he was best placed to salvage this vital relationship.

Musharraf's decision finally to step down, though loudly proclaimed by his political opponents as “a victory for the people,” was in fact widely recognized as proof that the exercise of power in Pakistan remains closely tied to support from the army and from the country's foreign benefactor—the United States. The general had lost the support of both.

## NATION FOR HIRE

Musharraf's resignation was also evidence of a larger truth that has long unsettled the politics of Pakistan—its status as a rentier state. Political scientists generally use the term “rentier state” to describe states that finance more than 40 percent of their expenditures through “revenue accruing directly from abroad.” Recently, the term has also come to refer to any state that hires out its services to the highest bidder. Pakistan qualifies neatly on both counts.

Economists have repeatedly drawn attention to the country's heavy dependence on external capital flows, especially from the United States, and have shown that such flows reached their highest levels in the 1960s, the 1980s, and from 2001 onward—times

when the United States called on Pakistan's services as a close ally. All three periods coincided with times of military rule, during which high growth was achieved but little investment was made in key social sectors like education and health.

Instead, the three periods saw a significant expansion in Pakistan's defense arsenal—a fact confirmed by recent US congressional reports showing that the bulk of an estimated \$12 billion in US aid received by Pakistan since September 2001 has gone to service the needs of the military establishment, especially the army. It is as the beneficiary of this American largesse that the Pakistani military has been expected to deliver certain services as an ally in the US-led war on terror.

Heading the list of the army's obligations has been the elimination of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces that took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas after being forced to flee Afghanistan during the US military attack in 2001. However, Washington clearly did not appreciate at that time (distracted as it was by its plans to invade Iraq)

---

*Zardari and Sharif both regard their organizations as instruments for the promotion of private ends.*

---

that the Pakistani army's role as subcontractor would be compromised by the political ambitions of Musharraf, then the military commander in chief. President Musharraf, running with the hare and hunting with hounds, had already sealed a bargain with the parties of the Islamic religious right, parties that served as mentors and protectors of the Taliban.

This bargain involved resurrecting an "unholy alliance" (first forged in the late 1970s, but with roots that go deeper) between Pakistan's military and the country's clerical establishment. Its terms rested on farming out to religious parties (and their assorted militant subsidiaries) the business of pacifying the tribal areas—in exchange for the religious parties' help in limiting any challenges to the military's right to rule mounted by the so-called "democratic opposition," represented mainly by the PPP.

Initially, there seemed little reason to doubt that the bargain would succeed, since it appeared nicely to meet the needs of all parties. The United States was guaranteed a regular haul of high-value Al Qaeda suspects. The army could count on US largesse as a reward for its endeavors. The religious parties could look forward to entering the political mainstream after years of losing out on the electoral front. And Musharraf, of course, gained time to consolidate his grip on power.

## JUDGE NOT

So what disturbed this cozy equilibrium? It was challenged mainly by the expansion of two competing centers of power whose iconic symbols—the mosque and the judge—have in recent months served as reminders of the struggle between the religious and liberal forces that have been embedded in the heart of Pakistan since the establishment of the state. I refer, on one hand, to the consolidation of a powerful and increasingly autonomous militant front which, from its base in the tribal areas of the northwest, seeks to extend Islamic law to the rest of Pakistan; and, on the other, to the emergence of a strident lawyers' movement that is determined to establish the supremacy of constitutional law as shaped by modern democratic institutions. While the two sides may seem to represent two aspects of Pakistan's as-yet-unresolved national identity, the energy now animating both flows directly from decisions Musharraf made in order to shore up his questionable legitimacy.

After reneging on a promise he made in 2004 to stay on as president but give up his role as army chief, Musharraf found his support wan-

ing among religious parties. They held him responsible for violating the terms of the informal agreement whereby they, and not the military forces now deployed by the thousands in tribal areas, were to be responsible for pacifying militants concentrated in these areas. Attempts to calm the Islamist opposition during peace talks in 2005 and 2006 proved futile. And Musharraf was forced to make concessions that significantly eroded his regime's authority in the tribal areas and threatened even to challenge its writ in the country's capital, Islamabad.

Islamist militants, most with close links to the tribal and northern regions of North-West Frontier Province, were galvanized into action in July 2007 during a conflict centered around the famous Red Mosque in Islamabad. The mosque had a long-established reputation as a hotbed of Islamic radicalism; its leaders had openly called for President Musharraf's assassination, and had endorsed a series of vigilante actions in the name of Islam against "centers of vice" in the capital. A standoff with security forces ensued, ending in a bloody assault. The incident made the mosque a potent symbol of a movement that remained intent on establishing an Islamic purpose for the state.

A challenge from another direction came in the form of the lawyers' movement. It had begun in March 2007 in a protest against Musharraf's summary dismissal of the country's chief justice on charges of corruption—charges that were overturned by a judicial council four months later. It was after Musharraf decided in December of 2007 to impose emergency rule that this lawyers' revolt was transformed into something resembling a mass civil disobedience movement. Musharraf responded by dismissing 60 more judges, including Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry again (after the judiciary had reinstated him), and packing the courts with judges of his own choosing. His actions fueled further outrage, timed as they were in anticipation of a Supreme Court judgment that was expected to prevent Musharraf from seeking reelection.

At a stroke Musharraf forfeited whatever goodwill he still enjoyed among the liberal middle classes. They had looked to him in 1999 to restore the rule of law (which had been undermined, paradoxically, by Sharif, who as prime minister was engaged in a protracted confrontation with the judiciary). The middle classes also looked to Musharraf to return the country to its original course, which they understood as democracy

grounded in constitutional principles. Musharraf underestimated the power that can be exerted by a society in the throes of a minor “civil society revolution”—one led by an increasingly defiant media. It was not long before this grievous miscalculation helped make the chief justice a powerful symbol for those who saw themselves as the rightful heirs of the democratic state envisaged by Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Washington watched these battles with mounting consternation. Having invested heavily in securing Pakistan’s participation in the so-called war on terror, the administration of George W. Bush was not about to get sidetracked by the question of who owned Pakistan. However, the United States could no longer avoid the question of who in Pakistan owned the war on terror. For it was clear that if this war was to succeed, it had to be backed by a popular mandate.

## THE MURDER OF HOPE

This is where former Prime Minister Bhutto came in. Her return to Pakistan from exile in October of last year (after months of intricate political wrangling overseen by the United States) was meant both to paper over the cracks that were developing in Pakistani politics and to bridge the yawning gap between US and Pakistani perceptions of the conflict with Islamist militants. The carefully orchestrated plan underpinning her return called for the pro-Western Bhutto to serve as prime minister alongside Musharraf as a civilian president—though only after he was reelected while still in command of the army.

Bhutto’s liberal political credentials, it was hoped, would also calm the enraged legal fraternity that was clamoring for an independent judiciary. And her cooperation with the pro-Musharraf PML-Q, whose senior leaders enjoyed close relations with segments of the religious right, was expected to lull at least some of the Islamists into believing that they exercised influence. Holding it all together was a power sharing agreement sanctioned by the United States. It obliged Musharraf to issue a presidential ordinance (the now famous National Reconciliation Ordinance) that froze all corruption charges against Bhutto, allowing her to return home without fear of arrest, in exchange for her supporting Musharraf as a civilian president.

With Bhutto and Musharraf thus beholden to the United States and with each in command of resources vital to the United States—respectively, genuine popular support and control of the ar-

my—Washington could be forgiven for thinking that it was finally in a position to steer Pakistan toward its own objectives.

Fate was to decide otherwise. Bhutto’s assassination, during a campaign stop in Rawalpindi in December 2007, threw America’s carefully laid plans to the wind. Then, as if to compound the disarray, into the confusion stepped the United States’ least preferred option as leader of Pakistan: former Prime Minister Sharif. His return to the country from exile ahead of the February general elections was arranged at the insistence of the Saudis, whose importance in Pakistan as a powerful eminence grise is best judged by the fact that even the United States was unwilling to cross them—notwithstanding the threat to US interests posed by Sharif’s return.

Sharif intended to claim the mantle previously held by Bhutto, but strictly on his own terms. That he could soon be in position to set those terms became clear immediately after the February 2008 elections, when his party finished in a strong second place behind the PPP. The PML-N also swept the board in Punjab—the country’s wealthiest and most populous province—making the party’s support vital to the stability of any government.

Sharif, free from any obvious political debt to the United States, moved to define the parameters of his mandate. His priorities centered overwhelmingly on Musharraf, whom Sharif accused of compromising the sovereignty of Pakistan by forcing it into an alliance with the United States and of violating the country’s constitution by undermining an independent judiciary.

## TO BED, FELLOWS

Sharif’s return to the political scene has brought together forces hitherto opposed to each other. On one side are parties of the religious opposition naturally sympathetic to Sharif’s religious conservatism, but moved in particular by his anti-American rhetoric, which seeks to cast the “war on terror” as a war against Islam. On the other side stands the legal fraternity, whose demand for the reinstatement of the deposed judges and for an independent judiciary has also been espoused by Sharif. Indeed, Sharif’s open support for these causes has come in sharp contrast to the more muted attitude of the United States, which is now accused of working against the rule of law.

This unusual pattern of alliances could herald a significant shift in the development of Pakistani politics by combining for the first time two very different identities within Pakistan—the religious

and the liberal, or as some would have it, the Islamic and the secular. Given the surprising alliance of Islamic parties and legal reformers now supporting Sharif, it perhaps comes as no surprise that, according to a poll published in June by two US think tanks (the New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow), Sharif is the country's most popular leader, with 86 percent of Pakistanis expressing a favorable opinion of him compared to just 13 percent for Zardari.

This state of affairs was not lost on Zardari, who sought to regain lost ground this summer by describing Musharraf as a "relic of the past" and by forging ahead with plans to impeach the president if he insisted on clinging to power. But at the same time, Zardari's resistance to the reinstatement of the judges could inflict lasting damage on his party. For not only has the new president misjudged the popular mood; he also risks losing the moral high ground to Sharif. While the issue of restoring the judges may be an elite concern, it also enjoys wide support insofar as the judges' continuing suspension serves as a reminder of the Musharraf regime, whose unpopularity was conclusively demonstrated in the general elections.

---

*The devastating bomb attack on the Marriott Hotel suggests that a dangerous tipping point could be imminent.*

---

### **SPINNING OUT OF CONTROL?**

It might appear that, with Zardari at the helm, time remains, at least for a while, on the side of those still working to allow the original US-backed power sharing agreement to mature, this time under the aegis of Zardari and his PPP. But just how much time does Pakistan have before it again finds itself taking orders from a military chief? The army appears to show little appetite for intervention, at least at this stage; in July, however, it acquired fresh, sweeping powers from the government to tackle the spread of militancy in the tribal region and northern regions of the North-West Frontier Province. It is far from clear whether these powers are restricted to planning military operations or whether they will extend (as some senior officials in the Frontier Province have alleged they will) to a right of veto on the terms of government negotiations with the region's militant groups.

This in turn raises questions about whether the army is still informally playing a lead role in decision making. Indeed, a recent report by

the Texas-based think tank Stratfor claimed that since February Musharraf's regime has effectively been replaced by what the report calls "a civil-military hybrid." Stratfor also suggests somewhat ominously that the country's failure to stop the spiral of militant violence has gravely weakened the army, which—like its civilian counterparts in this hybrid arrangement—has simply lost the will or the ability to confront the militant threat. Pakistan, the report concludes, is "spinning out of control."

If so, US patience might wear thin with a government that, by all accounts, remains deeply divided over whether to engage in talks with tribal militants or to intensify military operations in the tribal and northwest regions of the country. The United States strongly opposes negotiations, insisting that militants will use a lull in fighting to regroup, and US opposition has so far pre-empted any decisive move in favor of negotiations. So too has concern that the new government, having finally secured the tacit approval of a reluctant US administration to oust Musharraf, should not be seen as lacking the muscle

to contain the militant threat.

It is worth noting that the launch of the latest military operation in the tribal district of Bajaur in early August—the bloodiest such operation since the new government assumed power—was timed precisely to coincide with the announcement of plans to impeach Musharraf. Soon after his resignation, a ban was imposed with much fanfare on the tribal militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban. The group's leaders have contemptuously dismissed the ban as "meaningless," considering that the organization is not formally registered nor does it possess known financial assets vulnerable to seizure.

These measures have done little in any case to quell speculation that the United States is now determined to continue with unilateral strikes against militant hideouts inside Pakistan and to take direct charge of operations aimed at rooting them out—even at the risk of provoking retaliation from Pakistani forces. Such speculation, fanned by reported skirmishes between US and Pakistani forces in September, ignites considerable anger in Pakistan. It heightens fears that US plans to "go it alone" will intensify the current climate of popu-

lar anti-American hostility and encourage further militant attacks on the pattern of the bombing of the Marriott Hotel.

## PATIENCE, PATIENCE

Many will probably perceive in this assessment excessive pessimism about the country's future. Nevertheless it is critical, in taking a long view of Pakistan's crisis, to acknowledge the difficulties facing the new government in the current context.

First, the new government, however committed to peace it might be, is gravely hampered by the consequences of a war against Islamist militants that is not of its making. Second, even if peace could be secured with one or more sets of insurgents, the sheer proliferation of militant groups over the past decade means that expectations of immediate gains are unrealistic. Third, if an effort is mounted to formally integrate the tribal areas into the rest of Pakistan so as to introduce economic and social reforms to this most deprived of the country's regions, the results likely would not be apparent for years—and improved conditions would depend on sustaining an extremely fragile peace agreement between warring parties.

Even to begin to overcome these challenges requires a determined move by the now extremely weakened coalition, especially its senior partner, the PPP, to forge a political consensus based on trust. This trust can only be restored in the present circumstances by the immediate reinstatement of the former chief justice and his court. Trust will also require restoring to the parliament its sovereign role as the main forum for political debate, making it once again a place where the country's rulers are held accountable and their performance is measured against public expectations.

Yet, for this to happen, the PPP must fulfill its pledge to curb the constitutional powers of the president to dismiss democratically elected governments; the army and its agencies must be prepared to be held publicly responsible for their actions in the tribal areas and elsewhere, such as Baluchistan; and the United States must understand that its interests in Pakistan would be best secured through what the journalist Graham Usher has aptly described as the exercise of "strategic patience." Like Usher, I remain skeptical about all three prospects. The journey to democracy in Pakistan, it seems, is going to be very long indeed. ■

### STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION (Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1. Publication Title: CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE. 2. Publication No. 0011-3530. 3. Filing date: September 18, 2008. 4. Issue Frequency: Monthly except June, July, and August. 5. No. of issues published annually: 9. 6. Annual subscription price: \$38.95 Individual, \$59.95 Institutional. 7. Complete mailing address of known office of publication (not printer) (Street, city, county, state, and zip): 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, 19127. Contact Person: Mr. Redmond. Telephone: 215-482-4464. 8. Complete mailing address of headquarters or general business office of publisher (not printer): 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19127. 9. Full names and complete mailing addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Daniel Mark Redmond, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19127; Editor, Alan T. Sorensen, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19127; Managing Editor, none. 10. Owner (If the publication is owned by a corporation, give the name and address of the corporation immediately followed by the names and addresses of all stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of the total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, give the names and addresses of the individual owners. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, give its name and address as well as those of each individual owner. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, give its name and address.): Daniel Mark Redmond, 422 Barclay Road, Rosemont, PA, 19010; Vera N. Redmond, 1642 Monk Road, Gladwyne, PA, 19035; Calvin P. Redmond, 1 Graystone Place, Warwick, NY, 10990. 11. Known bondholders, mortgagees, or other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: None. 12. Tax Status: The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months. 13. Publication Title: Current History Magazine. 14. Issue date for circulation data below: September 2008. 15. Extent and nature of circulation: A. Total number of copies (net press run): (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 11,964; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 12,146. B. Paid Circulation (By Mail and Outside the Mail): (1.) Mailed Outside-County Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 [include paid distribution above nominal rate, advertisers' proof copies, and exchange copies]: (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 8,780; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 8,783. (2.) Mailed In-County Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 [include paid distribution above nominal rate, advertisers' proof copies, and exchange copies]: (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): N/A; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): N/A. (3.) Paid Distribution Outside the Mails including Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid Distribution outside USPS: (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 2,217; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 2,534. (4.) Paid Distribution by Other Classes of Mail Through the USPS (e.g. First-Class Mail): (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 125; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 100. C. Total Paid Distribution [sum of 15B (1), (2), (3), and (4)]: (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 11,122; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 11,417. D. Free or Nominal Rate Distribution (By Mail and Outside the Mail): (1.) Free or Nominal Rate Outside-County Copies Included on PS Form 3541 (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 375; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 400. (2.) Free or Nominal Rate In-County Copies Included on PS Form 3541 (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 0; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 0. (3.) Free or Nominal Rate Copies Mailed at Other Classes Through the USPS (e.g. First-Class Mail) (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 0; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 0. (4.) Free or Nominal Rate Distribution Outside the Mail (carriers or other means) (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 0; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 0. E. Total Free or Nominal Rate Distribution (Sum of 15D (1), (2), (3), and (4)): (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 375; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 400. F. Total Distribution (sum of 15C and 15E): (average number copies each issue during the preceding 12 months): 11,497; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 11,817. G. Copies not Distributed: (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 467; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 329. H. Total (sum of 15F and G): (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 11,964; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 12,146. I. Percent Paid (15C/15F x 100): (average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 96%; (number copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 96%. 16. Publication of Statement of Ownership. Publication required. Will be printed in the November 2008 issue of this publication. 17. Signature and title of editor, publisher, business manager, or owner: D. Mark Redmond, Publisher. Date: September 18, 2008. I certify that all information furnished on this form is true and complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (including fines and imprisonment) and/or civil sanctions (including civil penalties).